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COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL IN TEXAS
by
Ernest E. Figari, Jr.*
M ENTAL incapacity raises two distinct problems in the area of crimi-
nal law. First, the lack of responsibility for a criminal offense by
reason of insanity; and secondly, the competency or ability of the accused
to stand trial. While insanity relates to the accused's mental status at the
time of the crime, incompetency relates to his mental status at the time
of trial.' Thus, the problem of competency to stand trial consists of a de-
termination of the accused's mental status not in relation to the crime,
but in relation to his trial proceedings.!
Not only do incompetency and insanity relate to different periods of
time, but the legal tests for each are quite different. Generally, the test of
incompetency is whether the accused can understand the nature and object
of the proceedings against him, comprehend his own condition in reference
to such proceedings, and consult with his lawyer in the preparation of his
defense.' Insanity, on the other hand, requires that the accused not know
the nature and quality of his act and be unable to distinguish between
right and wrong."
I. COMPETENCY PROCEEDINGS IN TEXAS
In Texas proceedings to determine the competency of an accused to
stand trial are governed by article 46.02 of the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure.' Although the statute speaks in terms of an accused's "present
insanity,"' reference is clearly intended to the incompetency of an accused
to stand trial." The use of the term "present insanity" is unfortunate
since that term usually connotes a serious mental disorder affecting legal
responsibility! It is widely recognized that an accused may be incompetent
* B.S., Texas A & M University; LL.B., University of Texas; LL.M., Southern Methodist Uni-
versity. Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas.
'Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105, 108 (1954).
'See Magnus, Mental Incompetency, 18 BAYLOR L. REv. 22 (1966); Mezer & Rheingold, Mental
Capacity and Incompetency: A Psycho-Legal Problem, 118 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 827 (1962); Robey
& Bogard, The Compleat Forensic Psychiatrist, 127 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 519 (1969).
1H. WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 428-30 (1954).4 1d. at 68-81.
'TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46.02 (Supp. 1970); see Note, Competency To Stand
Trial-Pre-Trial Procedures, 22 Sw. L.J. 857 (1968).
6 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46.02, §5 1, 2 (Supp. 1970).
'Id. § 2(a): "For purposes of present insanity, the defendant shall be considered presently
insane if he is presently incompetent to make a rational defense." See Townsend v. State, 427
S.W.2d 55 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968).
8Floyd v. United States, 365 F.2d 368, 374-75 n.9 (5th Cir. 1966); Magnus, supra note 2,
at 25 n.5; see Johnson v. United States, 344 F.2d 401, 406 n.13, 408 n.16 (5th Cir. 1965);
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON PROB-
LEMS CONNECTED WITH MENTAL EXAMINATION OF THE ACCUSED IN CRIMINAL CASES, BEFORE
TRIAL 128-30 (1965) [hereinafter cited as D.C. REPORT]. See also Hess & Thomas, Incompetency
To Stand Trial: Procedures, Results and Problems, 119 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 713 (1963). Prior to
the enactment of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure considerable confusion existed between
the concepts of competency to stand trial and insanity. In Ex parte Hodges, 166 Tex. Crim. 433,
314 S.W.2d 581 (1958), and Freeman v. State, 166 Tex. Crim. 626, 317 S.W.2d 726 (1958), the
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to stand trial, yet be criminally sane." Thus, a charge to a jury cast in
terms of "present insanity"'" could be prejudicial and violative of due
process."
A. Raising the Issue
The general wording of article 46.02 would seem to permit the question
of competency to be raised by defense counsel, the prosecution, or the
court. 2 Indeed, there is a duty upon all concerned to see that an accused
is not convicted while he is incompetent. 3 If the attorney for the accused
is aware of facts indicating his client's incompetence, he has a duty to
raise the issue,' barring some exceptional circumstances." Also, if evidence
is known by the prosecutor that casts doubt upon the competency of an
accused, he has a duty to disclose the information.'" Likewise, if facts come
to the attention of the trial court which suggest that an accused is incom-
petent, the trial court has a duty to order an appropriate inquiry."
B. Procedure and Operation
Separate Hearing. Once the question of competency is raised, article 46.02
contemplates that the issue "shall be tried in advance of trial."'0 Neverthe-
Texas court of criminal appeals held, in effect, that there was no significant difference between in-
competency to stand trial and insanity as a defense to a crime.
'E.g., D.C. REPORT 129-30; Cooke, The Court Study Unit: Patient Characteristics and Differ-
ences Between Patients Judged Competent and Incompetent, 27 J. CLIN. PSYCHOLOGY 141 (1969);
McGarry, Competency for Trial and Due Process Via the State Hospital, 122 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
623 (1965); Pfeiffer, Eisenstein & Dabbs, Mental Competency Evaluation for the Federal Courts:
I. Methods and Results, 144 J. NERV. MENT. Dis. 320, 321 (1967); Robey, Criteria for Coin-
petency To Stand Trial: A Checklist for Psychiatrists, 122 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 616, 617 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as Robey].
1 TEx. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 46.02, § 2(b) (2) (a) (Supp. 1970) states: "Instructions
submitting the issue of present insanity shall be framed so as to require the jury to state in its ver-
dict whether defendant is sane or insane at the time of the trial."
"1See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966); Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960),
wherein the Supreme Court stated that the legal test of incompetency is "whether [the accused]
has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational under-
standing-and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against
him."
" TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46.02, § 1 (Supp. 1970) states that the issue of com-
petency may be raised "on behalf of accused" without specifying the requesting party. Cf. D.C.
REPORT 19 n.1. See generally H. WEIHOFEN, supra note 3, at 440-42.
"a See generally D.C. REPORT 66-67.
'4See Owsley v. Peyton, 368 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1966); Plummer v. United States, 260 F.2d
729 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Goodwin v. Swenson, 287 F. Supp. 166 (W.D. Mo. 1968); Evans v. Kropp,
254 F. Supp. 218 (E.D. Mich. 1966); D.C. REPORT 85. See generally Note, Effective Assistance
of Counsel for the Indigent Defendant, 78 HARV. L. Ruv. 1434, 1438-40 (1965).
15See Daugherty v. Beto, 388 F.2d 810 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 986 (1968);
O'Beirne v. Overholser, 193 F. Supp. 652, 661 (D.D.C. 1961), rev'd on other grounds, 302 F.2d
852 (D.C. Cir. 1962); McGee, Defense Problems Under the Durham Rule, 5 CATHOLIC LAw. 35
(1959); cf. Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705 (1962).
"Ormsby v. United States, 273 F. 977 (6th Cir. 1921); Evans v. Kropp, 254 F. Supp. 218
(E.D. Mich. 1966); see Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959); Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28
(1957) ; D.C. REPORT 92. See also Note, The Prosecutor's Constitutional Duty To Reveal Evidence
to the Defendant, 74 YALE L.J. 136 (1964).
"Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966); Townsend v. State, 427 S.W.2d 55 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1968); TEx. Con CRtM. PROC. ANN. art. 46.02, § 2(g) (Supp. 1970).
1"TEx. COnE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46.02, § 1 (Supp. 1970). Prior to its amendment in 1969,
1 provided that the issue of competency could not be heard in advance of trial "except upon
written application on behalf of the accused with the consent of the State's attorney and the ap-
proval of the trial judge," Ch. 722, §§ 1-10, [1965] Tex. Laws 532-35. These limitations would
appear to conflict with TEx. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 34 (Supp. 1970), which provides that "no
person who becomes insane after he committed an offense shall be tried for the same while in such
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less, if facts raising a reasonable doubt as to the competency of the accused
come to the court's attention for the first time during the course of the
trial, the court is required to suspend those proceedings and convene a
separate hearing on the issue.1 It appears that the issue of competency can
be heard with the trial on the merits only when such procedure is requested
by the accused or his counsel."
Trial by Jury. Article 46.02 preserves the right to a jury determination of
the competency of the accused to stand trial."1 Presumably, this right
could be waived and the matter submitted to the court.2 However, there
is authority to the contrary."
Test of "Present Insanity." Section 2 (a) (2) of article 46.02 defines the
issue of "present insanity" in terms of whether the accused "is presently
incompetent to make a rational defense.""4 This test omits the requirement
of the federal standard that the cognitive functions of the accused be
intact," and may, therefore, be unconstitutionally narrow."
Appointment of Experts. Under section 2 (f) (1) the trial court is author-
ized to "appoint disinterested qualified experts" to examine the accused
with regard to his competency to stand trial." This provision is designed
to satisfy certain due process requirements28 that were overlooked by the
earlier version of article 46.02.2" Article 46.02 would seem to permit the
condition," and Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966), which suggests that due process requires
a preliminary hearing on the issue of competence to stand trial. However, in Townsend v. State,
427 S.W.2d 55 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968), the court of criminal appeals, construing art. 46.02 prior
to its amendment, held that when a lack of the state's attorney's consent precluded application of
§ 1, the accused was still entitled to a separate hearing on the question of competency under § 2
once a bona fide doubt about his competency is raised. See Note, Competency To Stand Trial-
Pre-Trial Procedures, 22 Sw. L.J. 857 (1968); Note, An Accused Has the Right, Upon Motion,
to a Hearing on His Competency To Stand Trial Before Trial an the Merits, 47 TEXAs L. REV.
147 (1968); cf. Steele, Criminal Law and Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 22 Sw. L.J.
211, 217-18 (1968).
"TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46.02, § 2(g) (1) (Supp. 1970); accord, Pate v. Robin-
son, 383 U.S. 375 (1966); Townsend v. State, 427 S.W.2d 55 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968).
"See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46.02, § 2(a) (Supp. 1970).
21 Id. §§ 1, 2. It should be noted, however, that there is no federal right to a jury hearing on
competence to stand trial. Jordan v. United States, 207 F.2d 28 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Higgins v.
United States, 205 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1953); United States v. McFalls, 247 F. Supp. 439 (E.D.
Tenn. 1965).
2 See TEX. CODE CrM. PRoc. ANN. art. 1.13 (1966).
"See Townsend v. State, 427 S.W.2d 55, 57-58 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968); TEX. CONST. art.
1, § 15; TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 46.02, § 2(g) (1) (Supp. 1970).
'
4 TEx. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 46.02, § 2(a) (2) (Supp. 1970).
21 In Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960), the Supreme Court stated that the test of
competency to stand trial is "whether [the accused] has sufficient present ability to consult with
his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and whether he has a rational as
well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him." Id. at 403 (emphasis added).
"See Noble v. Sigler, 351 F.2d 673 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 853 (1966), which
holds that the federal standard of competency to stand trial is applicable to state criminal pro-
ceedings.
" TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 46.02, S 2(f) (1) (Supp. 1970); see Steele, supra note
18, at 217.
"28See Bush v. McCollum, 231 F. Supp. 560 (N.D. Tex. 1964), aff'd, 344 F.2d 672 (5th Cir.
1965); Note, Equal Protection and the Indigent Defendant: Griffin and Its Progeny, 16 STAN.
L. REV. 394 (1964). See also REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON POVERTY
AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1963).
29Ch. 722, §§ 1-10, [1965] Tex. Laws 532-35.
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trial court to authorize an examination covering criminal responsibility
as well as competence to stand trial, even though a plea of insanity has
not been entered."s Such a two-pronged examination at the outset could be
of great benefit to an accused who is restored to competence after several
years and faces the problem of mustering evidence in support of a delayed
insanity defense."
During the course of examination the appointed psychiatrist will seek
to obtain information from the accused on which he can base an opinion
as to the accused's mental state. If the psychiatrist is subsequently per-
mitted to testify for the prosecution, the result may be that the accused's
own words are used against him." In an attempt to avoid a possible vio-
lation of fifth amendment rights, section 2 (f) (4) provides that no
statement made by the accused during an examination into his compe-
tency "shall be admitted in evidence . . . on the issue of guilt in any
criminal proceeding .... ' Article 46.02 does not however, prohibit the
examining psychiatrist from divulging, out of court, any information
obtained from the accused. Likewise, no provision is made for informing
the accused of his right to have counsel present at all critical stages of the
proceeding, which may well include the psychiatric examination.
Proceeding on the Merits. Article 46.02 fails to make any provision for the
accused who, although conceded to be incompetent, insists upon an im-
mediate trial on the merits because he has valid grounds for attacking
the charge against him." Situations may arise where the accused cannot,
as a matter of law, be convicted, or where a valid affirmative defense exists
which does not require his participation.' In these instances the accused
"See TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 46.02, § 2(f)(1) (Supp. 1970).
a' See D.C. REPORT 79-82.
"'See French v, District Court, 153 Colo. 10, 384 P.2d 268 (1963); State v. Olson, 274 Minn.
225, 143 N.W.2d 69 (1966); Stater v. Obstein, 52 N.J. 516, 247 A.2d 5 (1968); Lee v. County
Court, 27 N.Y.2d 432, 267 N.E.2d 452 (1971); D.C. REPORT 107-18; Danforth, Death Knell
for Pre-Trial Mental Examination? Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 19 RUTGERS L. REV. 489
(1965); Comment, Compulsory Mental Examinations and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination,
1964 Wis. L. REV. 671; Note, Requiring a Criminal Defendant To Submit to a Government Psy-
chiatric Examination: Ass Invasion of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 83 HARV. L. REV.
648 (1970); Note, Pretrial Mental Examinations in Maine: Are They Mechanisms for Compelling
Self-Incrimination, 18 MAINE L. REV. 96 (1966); cf. Wade v. United States, 426 F.2d 64 (D.C.
Cir. 1970). But see United States v. Baird, 414 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1969); United States v. Al-
bright, 388 F.2d 719, 722-26 (4th Cir. 1968); Alexander v. United States, 380 F.2d 33 (8th Cir.
1967); cf. Pope v. United States, 372 F.2d 710, 720-21 (8th Cir. 1967) (en banc), vacated on
other grounds, 392 U.S. 651 (1968); Winn v. United States, 270 F.2d 326 (D.C. Cir. 1959),
cert. denied, 365 U.S. 848 (1961).
"TEX. CODE CRIE. PROC. ANN. art. 46.02, § 2(f)(4) (Supp. 1970).
' See Lee v. County Court, 27 N.Y.2d 432, 267 N.E.2d 452 (1971). See also Thornton v.
Corcoran, 407 F.2d 695 (D.C. Cir. 1969); D.C. REPORT 112-18; Steele, Criminal Law and Pro-
cedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 24 Sw. L.J. 229, 237 (1970); Note, Right to Counsel at
the Pretrial Mental Examination of an Accused, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 448 (1970). Contra, United
States v. Baird, 414 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1969); United States v. Albright, 388 F.2d 719 (4th Cir.
1968); State v. Whitlow, 45 N.J. 3, 210 A.2d 763 (1965); Blankenship v. State, 432 S.W.2d
945 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968).
"See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46.02, § 2(b)(3) (Supp. 1970). But see Ex parte
Hodges, 166 Tex. Crim. 433, 314 S.W.2d 581 (1958).
asSee, e.g., United States v. Barnes, 175 F. Supp. 60 (S.D. Cal. 1959). See also D.C. REPORT
144-45; Foote, Pre-Trial Commitment of Criminal Defendants, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 832, 841-44
(1960).
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should not be prevented from having his defenses adjudicated."
Section 2 (b) (3) of article 46.02 does permit the issue of sanity at the
time of the alleged offense to be tried even though the accused may be
incompetent."8 Thus, if an incompetent accused is found to have been
insane at the time of the alleged offense he would be acquitted, subject to
possible commitment to a mental institution." In the event the incompe-
tent accused is found to have been sane at the time of the alleged offense,
the court is required to declare a mistrial on that issue. 0
II. PSYCHIATRIC EXAMINATION OF THE ACCUSED
Since a determination of the competency of an accused to stand trial
is largely predicated upon medical testimony, 1 a psychiatric examination
of the accused is almost always necessary. The purpose of such an exami-
nation is twofold: (1) to ascertain whether the cognitive functions of
the accused are intact, that is, whether the accused is able to comprehend
and understand his position as it relates to his legal status; and (2) to
determine if the accused's ability to communicate is such that he may
adequately cooperate with his lawyer in the preparation of his case. When
these two functions of the accused's mind are sufficiently intact, he is
mentally competent to stand trial. If either or both are impaired, he is
not.4
A. Problem of Communication
There has been a consistent failure on the part of the legal profession
to inform the examining psychiatrist of the specific questions that need
to be answered on the issue of mental competency to stand trial." Ques-
tions addressed to the psychiatrist on this issue range from the most
" See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.06 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1962); D.C. REPORT 143-46; Foote,
supra note 36, at 841-44; Magnus, supra note 2, at 66-72; Vann, Pretrial Determination and De-
cision-Making, 43 U. DET. L.J. 13, 30 (1965); Comment, Criminal Law-Insane Persons--Com-
petency To Stand Trial, 59 MIcH. L. REV. 1078, 1094-97 (1961); Note, Incompetency To Stand
Trial, 81 HARV. L. REV. 454, 455-56 (1967). Compare United States v. Barnes, 175 F. Supp. 60
(S.D. Cal. 1959), with United States v. Marino, 48 F. Supp. 75 (N.D. Il. 1957).
" TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46.02, § 2(b) (3) (Supp. 1970); see Foote, supra note
36, at 841-44.
"OTEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46.02, § 2(d)(1) (Supp. 1970):
(d) The following rules shall apply upon defendant's being acquitted by reason
of the jury's returning a finding that he was insane as of the time of the alleged
offense:
(1) If the jury finds the defendant to be insane at the time of trial, and it
further finds that the defendant should be committed to a mental institution, the
court shall enter an order committing the defendant to a State mental hospital or to
an agency of the United States operating a mental hospital or to a Veterans' Ad-
ministration hospital, and placing him in the custody of the sheriff for transportation
to the mental hospital to be confined therein until he becomes sane. The court shall
further order that a transcript of all medical testimony adduced before the jury
shall be forthwith prepared by the court reporter and such transcript shall accom-
pany the patient to the mental hospital.40 1d. § 2(e).
4"See Slough & Wilson, Mental Competency To Stand Trial, 21 U. PITT. L. REV. 593, 609-10
(1960); cf. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46.02, § 9 (1966).
" Scrignar, The Physician and the Law-Determination of Mental Competency To Stand Trial,
201 J.A.M.A. 343 (1967).
' McGarry, Demonstration and Research in Competency for Trial and Mental Illness: Review
and Preview, 49 BOSTON U.L. REV. 46, 49 (1969); Robey 616-17.
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general, requesting "psychiatric evaluation of the accused,"" to the highly
complex, couched in the strictest of legal terms."' Due process of law may
be compromised where there is a failure of communication between at-
torney and psychiatrist. To avoid possible confusion the question of com-
petency should be propounded to the psychiatrist in clear and intelligible
terms.' One suggestion is to frame the question of the mental com-
petency of an accused in terms of (1) whether the accused possesses
sufficient mental capacity to comprehend the nature and object of the
proceedings and his own position in relation to those proceedings, and
(2) whether he is able to advise counsel rationally in the preparation and
implementation of his own defense."
When the psychiatrist is called upon to evaluate the competency of
an accused he should be advised of the legal and factual setting of the
case. The need for the psychiatrist to be fully aware of the nature of
the proceedings facing the accused cannot be over-emphasized. No opinion
on the competency of an accused can be complete without consideration
of the severity of the charges, the complexity of the case, and the demands
which may be made upon the accused during the course of trial." Obvious-
ly, standing trial on a charge of murder or tax evasion involves the need
for considerably greater ability to assist counsel than does standing trial
for theft or driving while intoxicated.' If the psychiatrist underestimates
the level of mental competency required, he may send an incompetent
accused to face proceedings he does not understand.' On the other hand,
if he overestimates the demands that will be placed upon the accused,
he will unfairly deprive a competent accused of his right to a speedy
trial."
B. Mental Evaluation
Psychiatric opinions on mental incompetency should be based upon
a review of the mental history of the accused and an objective examina-
tion of his present mental status."2 If a mental disorder is diagnosed, the
psychiatrist should determine whether, and to what extent, the disorder
impairs the capacity of the accused to stand trial."' However, neither a
diagnosis of a psychotic disorder nor of intellectual deficiency is of itself
tantamount to a finding of mental incompetency. 4
Mental History. A previous history of mental illness or prior hospitali-
"Pfeiffer, Eisenstein & Dabbs, Mental Competency Evaluation for the Federal Courts: I1. Ap-
praisal and Implications, 145 J. NERV. MENT. Dis. 18, 19 (1967).
45 Id.
"See Hess & Thomas, supra note 8, at 715; McGarry, supra note 9, at 625; Robey 617.4
7 See Robey 617.
48 D.C. REPORT 99; Robey 620.
41 See Robey 620.
" See Pfeiffer, Eisenstein & Dabbs, supra note 44, at 18.
" TEx. CONST. art. I, § 10; see Pfeiffer, Eisenstein & Dabbs, supra note 44, at 18.
" See Balcanoff & McGarry, Amicus Curiae: The Role of the Psychiatrist in Pretrial Examina-
tions, 126 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 342, 343-44 (1969); Smith, Psychiatric Examinations in Federal
Mental Competency Proceedings, 37 F.R.D. 171, 174 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Smith].
53 Smith 173-74.
'
4 Pfeiffer, Eisenstein & Dabbs, supra note 9, at 325; Robey, 617-19; see D.C. REPORT 43;
Smith 174.
[Vol. 25
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zation may reflect upon the competency of an accused." Therefore,
efforts should be made to contact all authorities and institutions that
might have relevant information about the accused. Included are penal
institutions, hospitals, and the Veterans Administration. Additional back-
ground information should be developed through interviews with rela-
tives, friends, employers, and others."
Examination. Ideally, the accused should be admitted to a hospital or
clinic for observation over a period of several days.5' The circumstances
of each particular case may dictate a shorter or longer stay." Initially the
accused is given a routine physical examination.59 In cases where organic
brain disease is indicated, a complete neurological examination is under-
taken to determine the extent of the disability.0 Included are X-ray films
of the skull, spinal fluid examinations, and electroencephalograms. "
A psychological examination provides valuable objective evidence of
mental disability. 2 Therefore, an extensive battery of psychological tests
is usually administered." These tests can be used to measure intelligence, "4
pathological thought trends, degrees of mental and emotional disorder,
and organic brain damage. "5 Routinely included are the Wechsler Bellevue
Intelligence Scale, Wechsler Memory Scale, Bender-Gestalt, Rorschach,
Thematic Apperception Test, and Projective Drawings. "
Finally the accused is interviewed by the examining psychiatrist. The
total contact between accused and psychiatrist usually covers between
three and eight hours. "
C. Criteria
Comprehension of Court Proceedings. An examination of the accused
must show that when he goes to trial he will be aware of the court
surroundings and procedures. " He must be able to distinguish between a
plea of guilty and a plea of not guilty." The accused must be aware of
the principals involved, such as the judge, the jury, and the attorneys, as
well as the fact that he is the defendant in the proceedings."0 He must have
some awareness of the nature of the charges against him and the range
'5 See D.C. REPORT 31; Smith 173-74.
5"See D.C. REPORT 31; Pfeiffer, Eisenstein & Dabbs, supra note 9, at 322.
"v See D.C. REPORT 29-30, 81, 102-04; Pfeiffer, Eisenstein & Dabbs, supra note 9, at 322.
5See D.C. REPORT 29-31; Pfeiffer, Eisenstein & Dabbs, supra note 9, at 322.
59D.C. REPORT 31; Pfeiffer, Eisenstein & Dabbs, supra note 9, at 322; Smith 174.
60 D.C. REPORT 31; Pfeiffer, Eisenstein & Dabbs, supra note 9, at 322; Robey & Bogard, supra
note 2, at 520; Smith 174.
t D.C. REPORT 31; Pfeiffer, Eisenstein & Dabbs, supra note 9, at 323; Robey & Bogard, supra
note 2, at 520.
62 Smith 174.
63 D.C. REPORT 32; Balcanoff & McGarry, supra note 52, at 343; Pfeiffer, Eisenstein & Dabbs,
supra note 9, at 322.
'Robey reports, however, that "intellectual deficiency in and of itself rarely serves to render
an individual incompetent." Robey 325; accord, Pfeiffer, Eisenstein & Dabbs, supra note 9, at 325.
65 Smith 174.
"6D.C. REPORT 32; Pfeiffer, Eisenstein & Dabbs, supra note 9, at 322.
67D.C. REPORT 98; Pfeiffer, Eisenstein & Dabbs, supra note 9, at 322.
6 D.C. REPORT 132; Robey 619.




of possible verdicts. 1 The accused must be aware of the possible penalties
if he should be found guilty, particularly in the case of a capital offense."
He must understand what defenses are available to him."' Finally, the
accused must have some awareness of his legal rights, such as his right
to trial by jury, to counsel, and to protection from self-incrimination." If
the accused fails to understand even the relatively simple level of pro-
ceedings that would take place were he returned to court, he cannot be
considered competent, and the likelihood of his being able to advise
counsel adequately is so small that the remaining portions of the test
for competency become somewhat academic."
Ability To Advise Counsel. Determination of the ability of the accused
to advise counsel rationally in the preparation and implementation of his
defense seems to require that the psychiatrist talk with the accused's
attorney."
Generally, the accused must show the ability to counsel with and
accept advice from his attorney. He must be able to divulge to his lawyer
without paranoid distrust the facts of the case as he understands them."
He must decide with his lawyer upon a plea and approve the legal strategy
to be used by them during the trial.7 ' The accused must show a capacity
to maintain a consistent defense and not insist upon a change in strategy
without an adequate reason." The accused must also show a capacity to
maintain the attorney-client relationship. " For example, he cannot dis-
charge his lawyer solely on the basis of paranoid suspicions and still be
considered mentally competent.
Frequently, during the course of trial proceedings, the question of
waiver of rights arises. In such instance the accused should be able to
make simple decisions in response to well-explained alternatives."
The accused should be able to assist his attorney in challenging jurors.
He must show a capacity to listen to the testimony of witnesses and advise
his lawyer of any distortions or misstatements." Further, if the circum-
stances of the case make it necessary, he must show the capacity to
testify in his own defense." Generally speaking, if the accused is required
to take the stand, the level of competency should be higher.
7 1 D.C. REPORT 131; Robey 619.72 D.C. REPORT 132; Robey 619.
7I ld.
74 Robey 619; see McGarry, supra note 9, at 627.
75 Robey 619.
7 Id.; see Steele, sura note 18, at 217.
7





'1 D.C. REPORT 132; Robey 619.
"See Robey 619.
83 Id.
84 D.C. REPORT 131.
5 D.C. REPORT 131-32; Robey 619; see McGarry, supra note 9, at 627.
"6 D.C. REPORT 132.
8
7 Robey 619; see D.C. REPORT 132.
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III. WAIVER OF THE ISSUE OF COMPETENCY To STAND TRIAL
The evaluation of the mental status of an accused is largely a medical
function; however, the parties charged with raising the issue of mental
incompetency to stand trial have usually had no psychiatric training."s
Thus, an obscured mental disorder that could constitute grounds for a
finding of incompetency may be overlooked.8" The result may be the con-
viction of an accused who is in actual fact incompetent. Since the trial
of an accused person while he is legally incompetent violates due process,"
there is a strong likelihood that a resulting conviction is subject to col-
lateral attack."'
The issue of competency to stand trial is not deemed to have been
waived merely because the accused failed to assert it." The Supreme
Court has held that "it is contradictory to argue that a defendant may
be incompetent, and yet knowingly or intelligently 'waive' his right to
have a court determine his capacity to stand trial."93 After all "if one is
mentally incompetent, then, by definition, he cannot be expected to raise
that contention before the trial court and thus cannot be prejudiced by




IV. RETROSPECTIVE DETERMINATION OF COMPETENCY
Collateral attack of a conviction allegedly obtained while an accused
was incompetent poses a serious problem..5 The reviewing court is called
upon to look back to the time of trial and determine whether the accused
was, in fact, incompetent. What might appear to be a simple inquiry,
however, has become complicated by the passage of time. Indeed, there
is some indication that the problems associated with an after-the-fact
determination of competency make it an impermissible alternative. 8 This
8See Hess & Thomas, supra note 8, at 715; Rice, Mental Competency To Stand Trial Under
Federal Criminal Procedure, 1 WASHBURN L.J. 91, 101-03 (1960).
89 The selection of accused persons for psychiatric evaluation of their competency has been
described as "extremely haphazard." Pfeiffer, Eisenstein & Dabbs, supra note 44, at 19; accord,
Ordway, Discussion, 122 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 622 (1965).
"
9 Bishop v. United States, 350 U.S. 961 (1956).
O See, e.g., Lee v. Alabama, 386 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1967) (en banc). See also Swadron, Col-
lateral Attack of Federal Convictions on the Ground of Mental Incompetency, 39 TEMP. L.Q. 117
(1966).
" Carroll v. Beto, 421 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir. 1970); Kibert v. Peyton, 383 F.2d 566 (4th Cir.
1967); Floyd v. United States, 365 F.2d 368 (5th Cir. 1966); Sharp v. Beto, 276 F. Supp. 871
(N.D. Tex. 1967).
"Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 384 (1966).
"Taylor v. United States, 282 F.2d 16, 23 (8th Cir. 1960); accord, Carroll v. Beto, 421 F.2d
1065, 1067 (5th Cir. 1970); Floyd v. United States, 365 F.2d 368 (5th Cir. 1966); Sharp v.
Beto, 276 F. Supp. 871 (N.D. Tex. 1967).
9 See, e.g., Lee v. Alabama, 386 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1967).
9 See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966); Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960);
Clonch v. Boles, 419 F.2d 393 (4th Cir. 1969); Rhay v. White, 385 F.2d 883 (9th Cir. 1967);
Hansford v. United States, 365 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Holloway v. United States, 343 F.2d
265 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Brizendine v. Swenson, 302 F. Supp. 1011 (W.D. Mo. 1969); United
States v. Follette, 301 F. Supp. 1137 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), afl'd, 421 F.2d 952 (2d Cir. 1970);
Goodwin v. Swenson, 287 F. Supp. 166 (W.D. Mo. 1968); Sullivan v. United States, 205 F. Supp.
545 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). But see Crail v. United States, 430 F.2d 459 (10th Cir. 1970); Conner




is suggested in Dusky v. United State 7 where the Supreme Court ordered
a new trial in one such case because of "the resulting difficulties of retro-
spectively determining the petitioner's competency as of more than a
year ago."" Similarly, in Pate v. Robinson"5 the Court granted a new trial
after a lapse of six years since "the jury would not be able to observe the
subject of their inquiry" and "expert witnesses would have to testify
solely from information contained in the printed record."' "
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has sought
to avoid the implications of Dusky and Pate by requiring that the re-
viewing court initially determine whether, under the circumstances, it
can conduct an adequate restrospective hearing on the question of com-
petency." ' If so, then the reviewing court will proceed to the issue of
competency; otherwise, a new trial must be ordered."'
The approach suggested by the Fifth Circuit appears to have limited
usefulness"' because as time passes the likelihood of an accurate and just
finding on the question of mental competency decreases progressively.'
One authority has concluded that "[tihe question of past mental state
is, in the strictest sense, unanswerable.""10 A review of the various criteria
for mental competency that would have to be considered in retrospect
lends support to this view.
V. CONCLUSION
The question of an accused's competency to stand trial has generated
a number of difficult problems which article 46.02 fails to solve. To
clarify some of the points previously raised it is recommended that article
46.02 be further amended:
(1) The statute should be recast in terms of "competency to stand
trial" rather than "present insanity."
(2) The question of mental competency should be reframed in terms
of (a) whether the accused possesses sufficient mental capacity to com-
prehend the nature and object of the proceedings and his own position in
relation to those proceedings, and (b) whether he is able to advise counsel
rationally in the preparation and implementation of his own defense.
Additionally, the standard of competence should be considered as sub-
suming a number of subsidiary factors or criteria.
°'362 U.S. 402 (1960).
9Id. at 403.
55383 U.S. 375 (1966).
'Id. at 387.
"'tLee v. Alabama, 386 F.2d 97, 108 (5th Cir. 1967); accord, Carroll v. Beto, 421 F.2d 1065
(5th Cir. 1970).
102 Lee v. Alabama, 386 F.2d 97, 108 (5th Cir. 1967).
'Compare McLain v. Beto, Civil No. 3-2140 (N.D. Tex., filed Apr. 15, 1970), aff'd per
curiam, No. 30147 (5th Cir., Apr. 13, 1971); Clark v. Beto, 283 F. Supp. 272 (S.D. Tex. 1968),
aff'd, 415 F.2d 71 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Anderson, 280 F. Supp. 565, 573-74 (D.
Del. 1967); with Lee v. Alabama, 291 F. Supp. 921 (M.D. Ala. 1967), aff'd, 406 F.2d 466 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 927 (1969), and Sharp v. Beto, 282 F. Supp. 558 (N.D. Tex. 1968).
l° McGarry, supra note 9, at 626; Pfeiffer, Eisenstein & Dabbs, supra note 44, at 23; see
Carroll v. Beto, 421 F.2d 1065, 1068 (5th Cir. 1970) (Thornberry, J., concurring specially); Lee
v. Alabama, 386 F.2d 97, 108-13 (5th Cir. 1967) (en banc) (Tuttle, J., Thornberry, J., & Gold-
berg, J., concurring specially); Blunt v. United States, 244 F.2d 355, 364 n.23 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
" Pfeiffer, Eisenstein & Dabbs, suipra note 9, at 321.
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(3) The statute should make clear the right of the accused to waive
a jury determination of his competency to stand trial and have the matter
submitted to the court.
(4) The accused should have the privilege to prevent psychiatrists
and others participating in the conduct of an examination from testifying
to statements made by him that are relevant to the offense charged and
the examiners should be prohibited from divulging such statements out-
side of court.
(5) Article 46.02 should require that the accused be informed by the
court in advance of a statutory examination of his rights with respect
thereto. No sanctions should be invoked against an accused who refuses
to cooperate in a statutory examination.
(6) The conduct of a statutory mental examination should be made
impermissible unless at the time the accused is represented by counsel.
(7) The statute should make clear that legal or other defenses to the
offense charged which do not require the assistance or participation of
the accused may be presented to and passed upon by the court after the
adjudication of an accused as incompetent.
